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Infections caused by pathogens commonly acquired from consumption of food are not
always transmitted by that route. They may also be transmitted through contact to
animals, other humans or the environment. Additionally, many outbreaks are associated
with food contaminated from these non-food sources. For this reason, such presumed
foodborne outbreaks are best investigated through a One Health approach working
across human, animal and environmental sectors and disciplines. Outbreak strains
or clones that have propagated and continue to evolve in non-human sources and
environments often show more sequence variation than observed in typical monoclonal
point-source outbreaks. This represents a challenge when using whole genome
sequencing (WGS), the new gold standard for molecular surveillance of foodborne
pathogens, for outbreak detection and investigation. In this review, using recent examples
from outbreaks investigated in the United States (US) some aspects of One Health
approaches that have been used successfully to solve such outbreaks are presented.
These include using different combinations of flexibleWGS based case definition, efficient
epidemiological follow-up, traceback, surveillance, and testing of potential food and
environmental sources and animal hosts.
Keywords: whole genome sequencing (WGS), outbreak, one health, zoonotic, food, environment, animals,
investigation
INTRODUCTION
Infections caused by pathogens commonly transmitted by food are common, potentially all
preventable and therefore of major public health importance. They are a problem all over the world
affecting all parts of society in developing and developed countries (1). Although mostly presenting
as a self-limiting diarrheal illness, more severe illness requiring hospitalization is frequently seen.
Foodborne illness caused by certain pathogens, e.g., Listeria monocytogenes, carry a significant
mortality. Outbreaks are common with ∼1,000 outbreaks being investigated in the US every year
(2). Foodborne pathogens can be any infectious agent, e.g., bacteria, parasites, virus, and prions,
even though this review focuses on bacterial pathogens.
In the US approximately one in six persons acquires a foodborne illness every year (3).
However, it needs to be kept in mind that not all infections caused by pathogens commonly
transmitted through food are actually foodborne. Although illness is often caused through ingestion
of contaminated food, the primary reservoir of these pathogens is rarely food but rather animals,
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water or the environment. The reservoir of pathogens like
non-typhoidal Salmonella, E. coli, Campylobacter, and Yersinia
is primarily zoonotic, i.e., wildlife, pets, or food production
animals. Listeria monocytogenes is ubiquitous and may be found
in the environment, animals and food. A classical example
of a waterborne pathogen is Vibrio spp. but many foodborne
enteric pathogensmay also be transmitted through contaminated
recreational or drinking water. Ill humans can also infect
each other. Thus, infection caused by pathogens commonly
transmitted by food is a classic example of a One-Health
challenge. The One Health concept includes the health of
humans, animals and the environment. In this paper, the focus
is on human infections. If public health investigators only focus
their attention to food sources and vehicles when investigating
potential foodborne outbreaks, they will miss opportunities
to identify primary sources and prevent further illness and
outbreaks from animal or environmental sources. Even when the
vehicle is foodborne, e.g., meat from a specific supplier, a proper
conducted investigation should include a root cause analysis. For
example, in addition to removing a vehicle from the market, a
thorough trace-back of the vehicle to the primary production
should be performed, e.g., to the farm and the suppliers of that
farm, even if the ultimate source is in a different country or on
a different continent. This can best be achieved through a One
Health approach to investigation working across human, animal,
and environmental sectors and disciplines.
With the introduction of affordable and fast next generation
sequencers in the early 2000s, WGS has revolutionized molecular
epidemiology and laboratory surveillance of infections caused
by pathogens commonly transmitted though food providing
public health researchers with a tool of unprecedented precision
and discrimination for subtyping. Additionally, WGS may
provide a wealth of information at the push of a button that
exceeds what in the past was typically gathered using traditional
phenotypic and genotypic tests in public health laboratories
e.g., species identification, serotype, pathotype, virulence profile,
antimicrobial resistance, and plasmid content to name a few.
A description of the analytical tools is beyond the scope of
this paper and may be found elsewhere (4–6). Using WGS,
public health scientists typically detect outbreaks by looking
for tight clusters of infections caused by a specific pathogens
in time and space typically differing by <10 single nucleotide
polymorphisms (SNPs) or 10 alleles by core genome multi-
locus sequence typing (cgMLST) analysis (7). This is the typical
scenario of a monoclonal outbreak from a point source that has
been contaminated because of a single event (8–12). However,
in many outbreaks with a zoonotic or environmental source, the
outbreak strains have persisted in their hosts and reservoirs and
therefore have time to diversify beyond what is expected in a
point source outbreak (13, 14). In such outbreaks, the source may
also be contaminated with more strains leading to polyclonal,
possibly multi-species outbreaks. Detecting and investigating
such outbreaks pose specific challenges. In this paper, a number
of such outbreaks that recently have been investigated in the US
will be reviewed with an emphasis on their characteristics as
experienced with WGS using the cgMLST subtyping approach
used by PulseNet, the US molecular subtyping network for
foodborne disease surveillance (15), and how the challenges of
their interpretation was overcome.
A PERSISTENT POLYCLONAL OUTBREAK
OF LISTERIOSIS ASSOCIATED WITH
CONTAMINATION OF ICE CREAM
PRODUCTION PREMISES
In 2015, Listeria monocytogenes was isolated from a number of
samples of ice cream from a distribution center (https://www.
cdc.gov/listeria/outbreaks/ice-cream-03-15/index.html). Some
of these isolates matched four clinical isolates from a single
hospital in Kansas collected during the past year by PFGE and
WGS; a fifth clinical case in the hospital was infected with
an unrelated strain. The particular brand of ice cream was
regularly served in milkshakes at the hospital and all cases were
considered nosocomially acquired. This led to the inspection
of the company’s production facilities in three states by local
authorities and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
over the next months. Numerous samples from the production
facilities and products from two states were positive for Listeria
in low numbers (16). All of the new isolates were compared
against the PulseNet database using PFGE and WGS. Five
clinical isolates from patients in three states matched product
or production environment isolates by WGS spanning the years
2010–2014. Researchers from FDA compared the sequences
of 137 food and environmental and nine clinical isolates (17).
This analysis included the four clinical isolates from the hospital
outbreak that matched any food or environmental isolates. The
isolates represented 13 PFGE patterns but were clustered in only
two groups by SNP analysis, one corresponding to the hospital
cluster in Kansas and the other containing the historical clinical
isolates from three states. All isolates belonged to sequence
type (ST) 5 of clonal complex 5 (CC5) of lineage I, molecular
serogroup IIb (serotypes 1/2b, 3b, or 7). The isolates within the
clusters differed from each other by up to 29 SNPs and between
each cluster by 40–52 SNPs. A summary of the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) cgMLST analysis with
representative isolate sequences of the outbreak isolates using
the PulseNet customized version of the Pasteur scheme (18) is
shown in Figure 1.
The fifth Kansas hospital isolate is not included in the figure
since it belongs to a different lineage, ST and serotype, lineage II,
ST573 and serotype 1/2a, and differs by 1,290–1,377 alleles from
any other outbreak isolate. This analysis are generally consistent
with the FDA SNP analysis (17). Two clusters are seen, one
containing the four Kansas hospital patient isolates and food
and environment isolates from one plant and the other the five
historical clinical isolates and the non-human isolates from the
other facility. Isolates in each cluster differ from each other by
up to 16 and 10 alleles, respectively. The two clusters differed
by up to 123 alleles. The genetic differences observed within
each cluster is slightly higher than typically is observed for point
source outbreaks. However, the allele differences between the
two clusters were twice as high than observed in the FDA SNP
analysis and an average number of allele differences of more than
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FIGURE 1 | cgMLST UPGMA tree of Lineage I isolate sequences the Listeria outbreak linked to ice cream. All clinical isolates and a representative sample of
non-clinical product and production environment isolates are included in the tree. The range of allele differences are indicated at the branches of the tree and for
clusters to the right of the tree.
100 alleles are higher than typically observed between isolates
that could be related epidemiologically (7). This speaks against
the hypothesis of a recent common origin of the two clones.
By phenotypic serotyping the isolates in the Kansas hospital
cluster was 1/2b whereas those in the “historical cluster” was
3b. Sequence types (from 7 house-keeping gene MLST) (19)
associated with serotype 1/2b strains often also contain serotype
3b strains (CDC, unpublished observation) so although we have
never observed two Listeria serotypes in a tight monoclonal
outbreak it is possible that strains of serotype 1/2b may evolve to
serotype 3b or vice versa. Although no attempt has been made to
use the data as a “molecular clock” to characterize the divergence
of the two clusters in this clone, it is not impossible that the
clusters could have originated from the same strain at some point
in the fairly recent past. It could have been introduced in the
two plants at the same time or first in one facility and then
shortly thereafter from the first facility to the second. The strains
may then have diversified further in each plant. Even though the
products seem to have been almost uniformly contaminated (16),
the contamination levels in the products were so low to rarely
cause disease. Such “low and slow” outbreaks, i.e., outbreaks that
go on for a long time with clinical cases occurring within long
intervals, could not be detected or were not further pursued in
the past because of the poorer resolution of PFGE. With the
superior resolving power of WGS, this has now changed. This
challenges the time aspect of a typical outbreak investigation,
i.e., a cluster of clinical illness in space and time. A typical
monoclonal point source outbreak evolves quickly over days to
a few months. However, this outbreak shows that the time aspect
of the clustering may be much longer, i.e., years. This outbreak
is also noteworthy for two other aspects: (1) both clusters were
detected by matching food/environmental isolates to clinical
cases, and (2) the diversity by PFGE was higher than observed
by WGS; at least 16 different PFGE profiles were observed
by PulseNet, whereas WGS indicated that two possibly related
clones caused it with one case patient harboring a third unrelated
strain. It is well-known that PFGE diversity is driven by loss or
acquisition of mobile genetic elements and not by mutations. In
their study of this outbreak, Chen et al. (17) observed that loss
or gain of prophages could explain some of the PFGE variations.
Such gains and losses typically occur during long term in vivo
propagation of a strain and therefore supports the notion that the
outbreak strain evolved over the years and it likely was present
in the production plants. Gains and losses of mobile genetic
elements are usually not reflected in a SNP or cgMLST analysis
since such sequences are often filtered out before analysis because
they distort the phylogenetic signal.
A PERSISTENT POLYCLONAL MULTI
DRUG RESISTANT OUTBREAK OF
Salmonella ser. HEIDELBERG LINKED TO
CHICKEN FROM SINGLE PRODUCTION
COMPANY
This outbreak was investigated using PFGE, the PulseNet
primary subtyping method at the time it happened. After the
outbreak was over, WGS was conducted on a small sample
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FIGURE 2 | cgMLST UPGMA tree of a representative sample of sequences of Salmonella ser. Heidelberg isolates displaying the full WGS diversity and representing
the seven PFGE patterns from the outbreak associated with chicken produced by Company A. The range of allele differences are indicated at the branches of the tree
and subclusters to the right of the tree.
of 30 isolates representing all PFGE patterns and sources, and
representative antimicrobial susceptibilities (https://www.cdc.
gov/salmonella/heidelberg-10-13/index.html). The investigation
began after a cluster of infections caused by Salmonella
ser. Heidelberg of a rare PFGE pattern (PulseNet pattern
JF6X01.0258) was detected by PulseNet in 2013 (20). At the same
time, a chicken breast retail sample from a production company
A cultured positive for the same strain. During a few months
following the detection of the outbreak, six additional clusters
of clinical isolates were identified. Some of the PFGE patterns
in these clusters were similar to the original outbreak pattern
(differing by up to three bands) and since the patients clustered
in time, geographic distribution and food history with patients
from the first cluster, all seven clusters were merged into the
investigation. Six out of seven outbreak strains were found in
left-over raw chicken from patient homes and from products
from three production establishments of company A. A total of
634 outbreak related patients were identified in 29 states and
Puerto Rico. Antimicrobial susceptibility testing of patient and
product isolates showed numerous profiles with isolates being
pan-susceptible, resistant to one, two, three, or more classes
of antimicrobials with weak correlation between resistance
profile and PFGE pattern. Following recalls and operational
adjustments at company A, the outbreak was declared over a
year later.
A small sample of outbreak related isolates from patients
with exposure to chicken from company A and product
samples were sequenced to shed further light on the outbreak
strains (Figure 2).
Clustering was performed by cgMLST using the PulseNet
scheme, which contains the same loci as the Enterobase scheme
(21). Isolates of the same PFGE pattern clustered together but
two subclusters (subclusters 3 and 5) contained isolates with
two PFGE patterns intermingled. Food isolates intermingled
with patient isolates of the same PFGE pattern by WGS.
Considering the whole outbreak cluster, isolates differed by up
to 58 alleles and within each subcluster by up to 24 alleles.
Using ResFinder (22) and PlasmidFinder (23), 14 different
resistance determinants, conferring resistance to seven different
drug classes, were identified; eight different plasmid types were
identified including commonmulti drug resistance plasmids, e.g.,
IncHl2, Incl1, and IncA/C2 confirming the diversity observed by
the other method. Due to the small sample of isolates that were
sequenced, the sequence variation was likely underestimated.
Salmonella ser. Heidelberg is commonly associated with chicken.
In this outbreak, the outbreak strains had probably been present
in the production system for long time, likely years, giving
them ample time to diversify and acquire/lose plasmids and
with them resistance determinants. It is likely that fewer case-
patients would have been recognized in this outbreak if cgMLST
alone had been used to detect and delineate it because of the
high sequence diversity among subclusters displaying the same
PFGE pattern. Thus, this is an example of an outbreak where a
subtyping method with poorer discrimination than WGS, i.e.,
PFGE, better identifies its full extent. It is likely that by WGS
small subclusters of highly similar isolates e.g., associated with
restaurant or other local events, would have been identified and
perhaps linked to products from company A. However, linking
them all together and identifying other outbreak related ser.
Heidelberg isolates among the large background of sporadic
infections caused by this serotype, would be a daunting if not an
impossible task.
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A Salmonella OUTBREAK INVOLVING SIX
SEROTYPES ASSOCIATED WITH
CONSUMPTION OF A HERBAL
SUPPLEMENT FROM SOUTH EAST ASIA
In early 2018, a tight cluster of Salmonella ser. I 4,[5],12:b:-
(monophasic Paratyphi B var. L(+) tartrate+ [formerly Java])
was identified by PulseNet (https://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/
kratom-02-18/index.html). The investigation soon confirmed
it as an outbreak and pointed to an unusual vehicle, an
opiod agonistic herbal supplement, kratom (Mitragyna speciose
also known as thang, kakuam, thom, ketum, and biak) sold
as powder, capsules, or tea. Leftover and unopened kratom
products were tested by local authorities and FDA for Salmonella
contamination and a number of different serotypes were
identified. The outbreak strain was confirmed in the product
by PFGE and WGS. A search of the PulseNet national
database identified potential case patients infected with some of
these additional serotypes, including Salmonella ser. Heidelberg,
Javiana, Okatie, Thompson, and Weltevreden dating back to
the beginning of 2017. Among these serotypes, Javiana and
Heidelberg are among the 20 most common among clinical
cases in the US, I 4,[5],12:b:-, Thompson and Weltevreden
less common but still among the 100 most common serotypes,
whereas Okatie is rare with 0–6 annual clinical cases typically
reported (https://www.cdc.gov/nationalsurveillance/pdfs/2016-
Salmonella-report-508.pdf). The outbreak investigation was
expanded to include these serotypes. No particular brand of
the product could be implicated but the product was recalled
from the market by several distributors and retailers, including
on-line businesses. In total, 199 cases were identified from
41 states (https://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/kratom-02-18/index.
html). Figures 3A,B shows cgMLST trees of representative
isolates from patients and kratom of ser. I 4,[5],12:b:- and
Okatie. Most of the I 4,[5],12:b:- isolates (Figure 3A) formed
a tight subcluster with no more than one allele difference and
this cluster lead to the identification of the source. However,
another subcluster contained isolates differing by up to 25
alleles and an additional two isolates differing from the clustered
isolates by up to 552 alleles. The ser. Okatie isolates were
loosely clonal (Figure 3B). Of this serotype, 10 clinical isolates
and 10 product isolates were sequenced differing from each
other by up to 78 alleles; four subclusters were identified each
containing isolates that differed by up to 2, 8, 9, and 13 alleles,
respectively. Of note, each subcluster contained both clinical and
product isolates.
The cgMLST results of the four other serotypes showed loose
clustering in between what was seen with the two serotypes in
the figures with more than 10 allele differences typically seen in
monoclonal Salmonella outbreaks.
Kratom is grown and harvested in several countries in
South East Asia and the sale and distribution systems are not
transparent. Thus, it is possible that product for sale in the
US originated from multiple producers in different countries
and that the same product could contain kratom from more
than one source. This likely explains why so many serotypes
were involved. It may be speculated that the cluster caused by
Salmonella ser. I 4,[5],12:b:- have recently contaminated kratom
from one producer since it was tightly clonal, whereas the
other serotypes may have been present in the production or
distribution systems longer giving them time to diversify or have
resulted in different contamination events at multiple producers.
Because of the observed strain diversity with all serotypes it is
unlikely that all clinical case-patients could have been identified
without the availability of product isolates. However, the cluster
associated with ser. Okatie could have been and actually was
detected before the ser. I 4,[5],12:b:- cluster by serotype-based
laboratory surveillance without considering WGS since it is so
rare in the US. However, the association to kratom was not
established before the serotype was detected in the product and
the patients interviewed about that exposure. This serotype has
scarcely been reported in the scientific literature but could have a
focus in South East Asia.
A POLYCLONAL OUTBREAK OF
MULTIDRUG RESISTANT Campylobacter
LINKED TO CONTACT WITH PUPPIES
SOLD IN A SPECIFIC PET STORE CHAIN IN
THE US
This outbreak was investigated and included illnesses reported
over 2 years from 2016 to 2018 (https://www.cdc.gov/
campylobacter/outbreaks/puppies-9-17/index.html). One-
hundred and eighteen cases of illness caused by Campylobacter
jejuni were identified in 18 states. The isolates were resistant to
7–9 antimicrobials including the drugs commonly used to treat
patients with severe illness, e.g., azithromycin, ciprofloxacin
and tetracycline. This particular multidrug resistant pattern
was very rare in the US when compared to data from the
National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System (https://
www.cdc.gov/narms/index.html). Infection was associated
with contact to puppies sold in a specific pet store chain.
Fifty-six clinical and puppy isolates were sequenced and
analyzed by cgMLST using the PulseNet customized version
of the Oxford scheme (24). A sample representing the full
diversity observed in the outbreak is shown in Figure 4. At
least three outbreak clusters were identified among the patient
isolates. Two of the clusters (cluster 2 and 3) also contained
puppy isolates.
In the cgMLST analysis for this paper, cluster 1 contained
clinical isolates that differed by up to 23 alleles; the second
cluster contained clinical and puppy isolates that differed by
up to 8 alleles, and the last cluster also consisted of clinical
and puppy isolates differing from each other by up to 28
alleles. All isolates were multidrug resistant as determined
by WGS using ResFinder, which produced similar resistance
profiles by phenotypic antimicrobial resistance testing examined
on select isolates. For a small subset of isolates, long read
sequencing was used to determine the genetic context of
resistance determinants. These determinants were found to be
located on the chromosome, or on a plasmid, or on both,
or missing altogether. While some determinant’s location, for
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FIGURE 3 | cgMLST UPGMA trees of representative samples of sequences of Salmonella ser. I 4,[5],12:b:- (A) and Okatie (B). Isolates of ser. I 4,[5],12:b:- all
displayed the same PFGE pattern. Isolates of ser. Okatie displayed three PFGE as indicated on the figure. Product isolate identifiers are indicated with rectangles
around them. The range of allele differences are indicated at the branches of the tree and subclusters to the right of the tree.
example the tetO gene, tended to sort according to clonal group
(plasmid for cluster 1 and 2, plasmid and chromosome for
cluster 3), other genes’ location, including several aminoglycoside
resistance genes, did not sort by cluster. Moreover, at least one
isolate had no plasmids but had all of the resistance determinants
seen in this outbreak on its chromosome. Thus, there was no
apparent correlation between plasmid content and resistance,
but the resistance pattern itself was relatively stable among
outbreak isolates.
MULTIPLE OUTBREAKS OF
SALMONELLOSIS LINKED TO SMALL PET
TURTLES, 2015–2016
Contact to reptiles is a well-known risk factor for salmonellosis.
Outbreaks associated with contact to small pet turtles are
common [(25, 26), https://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/agbeni-08-
17/index.html]. Their characteristics are similar and here we
focus on four multi-state outbreaks caused by Salmonella in
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FIGURE 4 | cgMLST UPGMA tree of a representative sample of sequences of clinical and animal isolates of Campylobacter jejuni from an outbreak associated with
contact to puppies sold in a specific pet store chain. Puppy isolates are marked with gray squares. The range of allele differences are indicated at the branches of the
tree and clusters to the right of the tree.
2015–16 (26) and in particular, the WGS results in one of them,
a polyclonal outbreak, caused by ser. Pomona and Poona. The
investigation began as a follow-up on a consumer complaint
about a child who had acquired a Salmonella infection from
a small turtle acquired at a flea market of a serotype involved
in turtle associated outbreaks years earlier (25). The PulseNet
national database was checked for PFGE clusters the past
year of serotypes previously linked to turtles. This way, four
multistate outbreaks with 143 case patients from 25 states of
three serotypes, Sandiego, Pomona and Poona, representing
six PFGE patterns were identified. This outbreak investigation
included testing of human, animal and environmental isolates.
Nineteen Salmonella isolates were cultured from the pond water
of four turtle production farms in Louisiana and from turtles
and water tanks from eight cases. Since turtles from the US
are exported all over the world, international inquiries and
literature review were conducted resulting in the identification
of one potential PFGE matching patient isolates in Chile and
four in Luxembourg. The patients from Chile and two from
Luxembourg had confirmed exposure to turtles. Of the 116 US
patients with information available, 56 (48%) reported exposure
to turtles. PFGE could not separate isolates from patients
reporting contact to turtles from isolates from patients with no
turtle contact. WGS was then used to test if isolates associated
with different sources could be differentiated by this method.
cgMLST results of isolates of ser. Poona and ser. Pomona from
the biggest of the outbreaks [outbreak 2 in (26)] are shown in the
Figures 5A,B.
The Poona isolates were loosely clustered in two tighter
subclusters. Overall isolates differed by up to 12 alleles whereas
isolates in the two tighter subclusters differed up to seven and
five alleles, respectively. All isolates except one had the same
PFGE pattern JL6X01.0104; one isolate, in the first subcluster, had
a different PFGE pattern JL6X01.0554. Subcluster 1 contained
isolates from Luxembourg, clinical isolates from the US and
a turtle tank water isolate from a patient’s home. The second
subcluster also contained patient isolates from the US and
one turtle tank water isolate. Whereas, the allele variation in
each subcluster was <10 alleles typically observed in point
source outbreaks, each of them could have been detected by
WGS. Because they were less related between clusters, an
association between them to the same source might not have
been suspected without additional information, i.e., exposure
information and/or a non-human isolate linking them to turtles.
The isolates from Luxembourg were obtained in 2012 and 2013
indicating that the ser. Poona isolates from 2015 to 2016 had
hardly evolved.
The Pomona isolates all displayed the same PFGE profile
and formed two tight subclusters and three isolate that
appeared unrelated to the two subclusters. The first subcluster
contained clinical isolates from patients with turtle exposure
and isolates from turtles, pond, and tank water; the subcluster
also contained the patient and associated turtle isolate from
Chile from 2014 (2493-2014 and 2492-2014 in the figure).
The sequences in this subcluster differed from each other by
up to seven alleles. Isolates in the second subcluster differed
by up to four alleles. It only contained clinical isolates and
all patients reported no turtle exposure. A common exposure
between patients in this subcluster was never identified. The
three non-clustered isolates were a turtle isolate (2016K-
0057) from an earlier outbreak in 2012 and two current
clinical isolates.
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FIGURE 5 | cgMLST UPGMA trees of representative samples of sequences from one of the Salmonella outbreaks associated with turtle exposure. (A) shows the
relationships between isolates of ser. Poona; isolates from the environment, from Luxemburg or of a PFGE pattern different from that displayed by all other isolates in
the figure are indicated next to the strain identifier. (B) shows the relationship between isolates of ser. Pomona; the source of the isolates is indicated next to the strain
identifier. Isolates 2493-2014 and 2492-2014 are from Chile. The range of allele differences are indicated at the branches of the tree and subclusters to the right of the
tree.
DISCUSSION
A well-functioning surveillance system that integrates elements
from public and animal health and the food production is
optimal to detect, investigate, and solve infections commonly
transmitted through food (27). The examples provided in this
paper illustrate that zoonotic outbreaks and outbreaks with a
persistent environmental focus, which is typical for outbreaks
in the One-Health context, are often not tightly monoclonal
and may therefore be difficult to recognize through laboratory
based surveillance by whole genome sequencing (WGS). This
technology provides so much resolution that outbreaks that
are caused by strains that have had time to evolve in the
environment or in their natural hosts can be seen to have
more variation than observed in typical point-source outbreaks.
Using a One-Health approach in an integrated surveillance
system, epidemiologic information, and isolates from animal
and environmental sources, can greatly add to the ability to
discriminate relatedness to clinical outbreak isolates. A number
of different approaches may be used to detect, delineate, and
investigate these outbreaks.
Considering additional information extracted from the
sequencing information may help identify outbreaks, e.g.,
serotype information about an outbreak strain for a rare
serotype such as Salmonella ser. Okatie that was associated
with the outbreak linked to kratom described before. However,
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additional information may also cause confusion. For example,
detailed information about resistance markers and plasmids
can be confusing since these markers often not stable traits.
However, despite such diversity multidrug resistance was helpful
in recognizing and investigating two of the outbreaks described
before: the Salmonella ser. Heidelberg associated with chicken
from one production company, and the Campylobacter outbreak
linked to pet store puppies. Similarly, PFGE may be used
the same way. During the past 5 years, PFGE has remained
the primary subtyping method in PulseNet with WGS used
as a secondary confirmatory method except for Listeria where
both methods have been used concomitantly for real-time
surveillance. Campylobacter isolates are rarely subtyped in
PulseNet unless an outbreak is suspected by other methods, e.g.,
like a cluster of multidrug resistant cases in the puppy outbreak.
In the examples provided in this paper, PFGE mostly provided
too much discrimination between isolates or the opposite, failed
to differentiate isolates that were unrelated: multiple PFGE
patterns were identified in the Campylobacter outbreak but only
three clones were observed by WGS with so much variation
in two of them that it would have been difficult to recognize
them without additional resistance and exposure information.
The outbreak was eventually confirmed by isolating the outbreak
clones in pet store puppies and puppies owned by ill people. In
the Listeria outbreak, enormous diversity was observed by PFGE,
whereas WGS easily defined three outbreak clones/strains. In the
turtle Poona outbreak subcluster described before, WGS helped
differentiate PFGE clustered isolates from patients without
contact to turtles from patients who had this exposure.
If a persistent or zoonotic focus for foodborne pathogens
is suspected, the sequencing cluster definition may be relaxed.
This may be done by initially looking for tight monoclonal
clusters, e.g., differing by up to 10 alleles/SNPs, spanning a
short time span since logically isolates from patients getting ill
at the same time has a higher likelihood of originating from a
point source, which could be a sub cluster of a larger zoonotic
outbreak. Once the outbreak is recognized, and the initial patient
interviews indicate that exposure to animals or an environmental
source could be the vehicle, the case definition may be expanded
in increments to include isolates that differ from the index
cluster by for instance 25, 50, and 100 alleles or SNPs. Without
associated epidemiological information, this approachmay result
in the inclusion of too many epidemiologically unrelated isolates
during the outbreak investigation diluting any epidemiological
signal that may be present. Therefore, foodborne, zoonotic,
and environmental exposure information and isolates from
food, zoonotic, and environmental sources should be used to
determine different allele or SNP cutoffs choosing the values that
provide the strongest epidemiological association. The utility of
having access to sequencing information from potential sources
is also extremely useful when working on an outbreak with a
zoonotic or environmental focus. However, the ability to gather
this information from animal isolates can be limited, as there
often are few animal isolates available for comparison purposes
during outbreaks, unless additional efforts are undertaken to
collect them. This is at variance with clinical isolates, which are
routinely collected by public health laboratories and sequenced
to obtain additional information. Representative enteric bacterial
isolates collected from animals are not routinely sequenced in the
US. As shown in all the outbreaks described before, obtaining
isolates from the potential sources was helpful to confirm the
vehicle and also to facilitate recognition of the outbreak (the
Listeria outbreak) or define its full scope (the ser. Heidelberg
outbreak and the Salmonella outbreak linked to kratom). Thus,
the importance of using a One-Health or farm to a table approach
with efficient trace back when investigating outbreaks caused
by pathogens commonly transmitted through food cannot be
over emphasized.
International outbreaks caused by foodborne pathogens are
common andWGS has the potential of bringing their recognition
to the next level as more laboratories implement WGS in their
routine surveillance. Until now most international outbreaks
have been recognized by linking national outbreaks to each other
when one country is investigating an outbreak with possible
international spread and contacts other countries. Public health
authorities in another country or countries may be contacted
directly if there is a strong suspicion that the source of the
outbreak is present in that country/those countries. Alternatively,
the country may send out an inquiry through international
rapid alert systems, e.g., the European RASSF system (https://
ec.europa.eu/food/safety/rasff_en), or alert WHO through the
IHR system (28). However, the information is more commonly
shared broadly through listservs or data sharing boards,
e.g., the European Center for Disease Prevention & Control
(ECDC) EPIS system (29), the WHO INFOSAN (https://www.
who.int/foodsafety/areas_work/infosan/en/) or the PulseNet
International forum (30). The countries who receive this
information are expected to report whether they are investigating
a similar outbreak or see the frequency of the outbreak strain
at a higher than usual rate in their surveillance of clinical and
non-human surveillance isolates. If a country routinely uses a
low discriminatory subtypingmethod for laboratory surveillance,
e.g., species or serotype, this kind of comparison is insensitive and
countries with one or a few outbreak related isolates are likely to
overlook them. For instance, two of the outbreaks described here,
the kratom and turtle-associated Salmonella outbreaks, were
linked to globally distributed vehicles and yet, only two countries
reported cases associated with turtle outbreak and no cases linked
to kratom were detected outside the US. Another weakness of
the international inquiry approach is that the comparison is
not performed until an investigation is well under way in one
country thereby delaying the investigation. Any country should
ideally be able to access subtyping information on isolates from
other countries in order to recognize international outbreaks fast.
Except for the US and Canada who since 2005 have had access
to each other’s PulseNet databases, no other countries shared
molecular surveillance data this way in real-time until the advent
of WGS.
The potential of WGS to transform detection and
investigation of international outbreaks was realized already
in 2011 when scientists from what was later established as
the Global Microbial Identifier (GMI) initiative met with the
European commission in Brussels. The outcome of the meeting
was published as a white paper (31). GMI envisions a global
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system of DNA genome databases for microbial and infectious
disease identification and diagnostics fully embracing the
One-Health concept. Sharing of surveillance sequence data with
the global scientific community supports the mission of public
health institutions and the One Health concept by facilitating
early recognition and investigation of international outbreaks
that a country is impacted by and therefore need to know about
in order to act to protect its citizens. A global system for sharing
of genomic data will benefit those tackling individual problems at
the frontline, clinicians, veterinarians, environmental scientists,
as well as policy-makers, regulators, and industry. By enabling
access to this global resource, a professional response on health
threats will be within reach of all countries with basic laboratory
infrastructure (http://www.globalmicrobialidentifier.org/).
PulseNet expanded on that vision in 2017 (32) suggesting a
global system of databases containing data extracted from raw
sequences of foodborne pathogens using standard analytical
pipelines including the cgMLST pipelines used by PulseNet USA
in this paper. The advantage of storing data extracted using
standardized methods is 2-fold, (i) the data volume is greatly
reduced enabling its exchange over slow internet connections,
which is still the standard in many developing countries, and
(ii) the data are standardized and can be used with minimal
additional processing by any PulseNet participant ensuring
fast comparison of data from databases in different regions of
the world. Also, similar to PulseNet practices, realizing this
global vision would likely be aided by additional laboratories
submitting raw sequence files of all isolates obtained as part of
routine surveillance in real-time to public repositories, e.g., the
European Nucleotide Archive (ENA), the DNA Data Bank of
Japan (DDBJ) or the GenomeTrakr databases in the Sequence
Read Archive (SRA) at the National Center for Bioinformatics
Information (NCBI). However, this is currently not possible
for institutions in many countries for different reasons, e.g.,
protection of personal identifiable information (PII), intellectual
property rights, or protection against scientific parasitism,
i.e., publication of analyzed data generated by others without
permission. The federal agencies in the US including CDC,
FDA, and the US Department of Agriculture’s (USDA’s) Food
Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) have uploaded all their raw
sequences to the SRA in real time for the last 5 years without any
noticeable adverse effects. An increasing number of agencies and
institutions in other countries are now following suit, but there
is still a long way to go before this is done by all countries.
CONCLUSIONS
Outbreaks linked to animals and environmental sources can
be challenging to recognize by laboratory surveillance by WGS
because they are often polyclonal andmore diverse than observed
in typical point source outbreaks. The availability and use
of supporting epidemiological information and microbiological
information from non-clinical sources may be critical for their
recognition and successful investigation. In the future, linking
public health and food regulatory databases that include patient
and food/feed/ingredient demographics, interview data, and
microbiological data to national and international databases
containing diverse types of other information, e.g., trade and
distribution of different commodities, including live animals,
raw agricultural products, processed foods, and international
travel information, to name a few, could be used in a
“big data” approach to detect and investigate outbreaks
sometimes even before they become apparent by traditional
syndromic or laboratory surveillance. However, critical first
steps toward this vision include collection and sequencing
of isolates from animal and environmental sources and all
countries agree to make all their WGS surveillance data
available to the others as they are generated before an outbreak
is suspected.
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